




















Food Consumption and Nutrition Division 
 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
2033 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 U.S.A. 
(202) 862￿5600 















FCND Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and are circulated prior to a full 
peer review in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment. It is expected that most Discussion Papers 
will eventually be published in some other form, and that their content may also be revised. 
RACE, EQUITY, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN 
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA:  
IS OPPORTUNITY EQUAL FOR ALL KIDS? 
 
Futoshi Yamauchi   ii
Abstract 
This paper examines dynamic changes in educational quality and equity 
differences in the public school system between Black and other racial groups in post-
apartheid South Africa, using the ratio of learners to educators in each school, available 
from the School Register of Needs, 1996 and 2000.  The analysis incorporates school- 
and community-level unobservables and the endogenous movement of learners.  This 
paper shows that (1) the learner-educator ratios significantly differ between formerly 
Black and White primary and secondary schools in 1996 and 2000, and (2) in the 
adjustment of educators in response to changes in the number of learners in this period, 
there are significant differences between formerly Black and non-Black (White, 
Coloured, and Indian) primary schools.  The opportunities for education in public schools 
are still unequal between Black and White children, even after apartheid.  Given that 
school quality affects returns to schooling and earning opportunities in labor markets, the 
inequality causes income inequality between Black and White.  The empirical result calls 
for stronger policy intervention to support Black schools and children in South Africa. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the transition from apartheid to a democratic society in South Africa after the 
first democratic national election in 1994, the government promised to provide equal 
opportunities for education to all racial groups and regions (Republic of South Africa 
1996a, 1996b).  However, as reported in the Education Atlas of South Africa (Bot, 
Wilson, and Dove 2000), there are still wide variations in major indicators of educational 
quality across regions.  Given the clustered spatial distribution of racial groups in the 
country, it is not difficult to infer variations among children across different population 
groups.  This paper uses recently available South African school census data from 1996 
and 2000 to assess variations in educational quality across former population groups of 
public schools and dynamic changes in post-apartheid South Africa. 
It is increasingly recognized inside and outside South Africa that under apartheid, 
Black schools, such as those in the former homelands, were totally inferior to White 
schools in terms of funding (Crouch 1996; Kriege et al. 1994; Marais 1995).  Differences 
between Black and non-Black schools affected student achievement, particularly in 
numeracy (Case and Deaton 1999).  Unless the government actively strengthens its 
support to former Black schools in allocating both budget and personnel, a vicious cycle 
of poverty and low-quality education will persist:  children who cannot receive a 
sufficiently high quality of education are less likely to engage in regular employment and 
are more likely to suffer from low wages (see, e.g., Case and Yogo 1999).  Since they 
cannot afford to live in well-off residential areas where high-quality schools are more 
likely to be located, such people are likely to stay in areas with low-quality schools.  High 
residential rents also prohibit access to better schools and exacerbate this cycle, 
potentially contributing to the long-term poverty trap for Blacks in the country. 
To study gaps in educational quality across population groups, this paper focuses 
on the ratio of students to teachers and other staff￿the learner-educator ratio (LER).  The 
data comes from school censuses￿the School Register of Needs (SRN) in 1996 and 
2000.  In 1995, the government reached an agreement that ERs of 40:1 and 35:1 were to 2 
be achieved for primary and secondary schools, respectively, over the next five years.  
The LER can serve as a good indicator not only of the distribution of education quality 
but also of the effectiveness of policy interventions toward educational equity. 
Recent qualified empirical works show significant effects of LER and class size 
on student achievement, although the literature contains some ambiguity (Hanusheck 
1998).  The difficulty in identifying the causality arises from potential endogeneity in 
classroom size
1 and unobserved fixed components specific to school and community, 
which are likely correlated with school input.  For example, Lazear (2001) argues that the 
effect of LER on student achievement could be empirically ambiguous because of often 
unobserved heterogeneity in student quality, e.g., discipline.  In his model, the optimal 
size (i.e., LER) increases as students￿ discipline increases, since the probability of 
disruption in a classroom decreases.  To avoid such a correlation between LER and 
unobservable conditions, recent studies use exogenous variations in LER and class size to 
identify the effect on student achievement (see, e.g., Angrist and Lavy 1999; Case and 
Deaton 1999; Hoxby 2000; Krueger 1999).  In these studies with exogenous variations in 
LER, the effect is found to be significant.  In the context of South Africa, Case and 
Deaton (1999) show that among Blacks who were prohibited from migrating under 
apartheid, LER has a significant effect on student achievement particularly in numeracy, 
while it is not significant among Whites. 
Table 1 compares mean LERs by population groups in both 1996 and 2000.  A 
striking fact in the table is that the gap between formerly Black and White schools was 
not narrowed during the period.  Formerly White schools kept their superior position in 
the post-apartheid period.  Though more detailed statistical analysis is in Section 4, the 
difference between Black and White schools seemed quite persistent and stable. 
                                                 
1 High levels of LERs are partly attributed to high grade repetition rates in South Africa.  However, those 
who have repeated grades are likely to transit to labor markets (Yamauchi 2003, using KwaZulu-Natal 
Income Dynamics Study). 3 
Table 1￿Learner-educator ratios (LER) in 1996 and 2000, by population groups 
  African White  Coloured  Indian  New  schools 
Primary  school       
  LER 1996  36.211  26.151  28.736  27.753  39.673 
  LER 2000  31.465  25.790  29.996  32.806  40.833 
Secondary  school       
  LER 1996  31.975  22.329  23.196  23.415  38.145 
  LER 2000  31.052  24.203  30.157  30.447  35.996 
Note:  Sample means are shown by population groups. 
 
The LER gaps can have some long-term implications.  For instance, school 
quality affects subsequent labor market outcomes (Card and Krueger 1996; Case and 
Yogo 1999; Dustman, Rajah, and Soest 2003).  Based on Case and Yogo estimates of the 
impact of LER on returns to schooling investments, the marginal effect of LER on rate of 
returns is around -0.002.  The mean gap of LERs between formerly Black and White 
primary schools was 10.060 in 1996 (Table 1), the equivalent of a 0.0201 reduction in the 
rate of returns.  The reduction is substantial on the ground that the average rate of returns 
is 0.089-0.094 for men ages 24-28 in 1996.  Thus, it is possible that the inequality in 
opportunities for education is transformed in the inequality in labor market earning 
opportunities in South Africa.
2 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets up a simple framework in which 
liquidity constraint is highlighted.  Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis (SRN 
1996 and 2000).  First, the surveys particularly focus on school facility information, in 
addition to basic information such as the number of educators and learners.
3  However, 
they lack information on financial conditions and student performance.  Second, to 
identify the former racial groups of those schools, SRN 2000 provides information on 
                                                 
2 In South Africa, Yamauchi (2003) shows that grade repetition increases the probability of transition from 
school to labor market and that it adversely affects the employment probability particularly for men.  Other 
conditions being equal, grade repetition is positively correlated with LER as more students remain enrolled 
longer. 
3 In previous studies using SRN 1996, Bot, Wilson, and Dove (2000) completed a district-wide 
characterization of school environments from various perspectives.  The South African Department of 
Education (2002) conducted a provincial-level characterization of SRN 2000 and 1996 and described 
dynamic changes in South African education.  In these studies, however, the data was not analyzed 
statistically. 4 
former apartheid departments that governed the schools.  By merging the two surveys, I 
can systematically track former apartheid departments.  Third, the sample used in the 
analysis excludes the provinces of Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and Northern Cape, since they 
changed school registration codes (EMIS codes) after 1996, preventing an accurate merge 
of the 1994 and 2000 data sets. 
Section 4 summarizes the empirical findings.  First, LER distributions for former 
Black, White, Coloured, Indian, and other racial group schools are statistically different 
in both 1996 and 2000.  In particular, the difference between former Black schools and 
White or Indian schools was statistically significant.  A large number of formerly black 
schools exhibit LERs above the targets set by the government (40 and 35 for primary and 
secondary schools, respectively). 
To identify how the number of educators was adjusted in response to changes in 
the number of learners, the estimation strategy takes into account both community- and 
school-level unobserved fixed components and the endogenously changing number of 
learners (fixed effect-instrumental variable estimation), using specifications directly 
drawn from the model in Section 2.  There are some interesting results.  First, the 
dynamic responses of educators to learners (with budget constraints) differ statistically 
across racial groups in primary schools, especially in the adjustment of subsidized 
educators.  Formerly Black schools are more budget (liquidity) constrained than non-
Black (White, Coloured, and Indian) schools in employing educators.  Second, among 
secondary schools, the gaps are smaller than those found in primary schools.  
Interestingly, formerly White secondary schools do not show any significant dynamic 
adjustment to changes in the number of learners during this period, probably because 
their condition was already optimal.  Third, in combined schools (both primary and 
secondary levels), the gaps between formerly Black and Indian or new schools are 
significant.  This observation reflects the facts that combined schools are regionally 
concentrated in certain districts and there are few White schools of this type.  Fourth, in 
the analysis restricted to nonsubsidized (privately employed) educators, the number of 
educators does not significantly respond to changes in the number of learners.  In this 5 
sense, the liquidity constraint is more binding at the school level than at the government 
level.  Concluding remarks are mentioned in the final section. 
2.  Framework 
Setting 
I discuss the optimal allocation (adjustment) of educators across schools under the 
assumption that the optimal LER is unique.  To clarify assumptions that allow a specific 
model used in this section, Appendix A provides some discussion of the optimal LER in a 
more general setting. 
Before describing the model, I factor out possible reasons for changes in 
classroom size.  First, natural population growth contributes to cohort size and, therefore, 
the number of school-age children in a community.  Second, after the abolition of 
apartheid, households could freely migrate from formerly Black areas to White areas.  
Third, parents could also send their children to live with distant family members, foster 
other children,
4 or send their children to private schools that belonged formerly to 
different population groups, even though these schools were not located in their 
residential area. 
In response to cross-sectional differences and dynamic changes in the number of 
learners in public schools, it is desirable to optimize the number of educators to maintain 
efficiency in learning and equity among children.  There are several scenarios.  Consider 
a stationary environment in which the total number of learners does not change.  If the 
local government coordinates employment of teachers and allocates them among schools 
with no transaction costs, the optimal ratio of learners to educators can be maintained, 
and LER will be equalized across schools. 
                                                 
4 Zimmerman (2003) shows that fostering raises school enrollment in South Africa.  The geographical 
movement of children is partly motivated by the desire to provide children with better educational 
opportunities. 6 
If schools have discretion over the employment of educators independently of the 
local government (e.g., principals decide to employ teachers with approval by school 
boards made up of community leaders, parents, and educators), the adjustment of 
educators depends mostly on the financial condition of each school and, to a lesser extent, 
on decisionmaking in each school.  Currently in South Africa, many public schools suffer 
from insufficient financial support from local and national governments.  In this case, the 
equalization of LERS is not necessary.  In other words, equalization of LERs is a 
necessary condition for, among other things, unitary decisionmaking (or interventions) by 
the government.  Even if the local government suffers from budget constraints, unitary 
decisionmaking will lead to equalization of LERs. 
In response to dynamic changes in the number of learners, budget constraints may 
matter at school and local and national government levels.  Under unitary decisionmaking 
by the government, it is easy to transfer educators from one school to another to equalize 
ratios across schools, even in a dynamically changing environment.  It is especially true 
in the post-apartheid regime, where people are ￿essentially free￿ to migrate.  This is the 
optimal response to dynamic changes in the total number of learners.  To maintain the 
current LER, however, the adjustment of educators (like that of capital stock) depends on 
the government￿s budget (liquidity) constraint, since the government needs new teachers. 
However, when public schools do not receive government subsidies (e.g., private 
schools), the situation is more serious.  Schools with binding budget constraints that 
cannot collect enough school fees from student households are likely to have great 
difficulty hiring more educators.  Also, unlike unitary decisionmaking, there will be more 
variations in LERs across schools, in this case since financial conditions are likely 
different between schools.  As a result, for quasi-privatized, budget-constrained public 
schools, LERs could vary widely in cross-section as well as time series. 7 
A Simple Model 
I set up a simple static model of school finances and the demand for educators to 
clarify intuitions on the roles of liquidity constraint, government subsidies, and 
government coordination in the determination of LER.  Suppose there are a finite number 
of public schools under a government, and that each school maximizes the per-learner 
output from education, given its budget constraint, without government intervention.  
Assume that each school can employ educators freely and that the number of learners 
changes exogenously at each school (for example, due to migration and population 
growth). 
Each school has its target LER in each period that maximizes the efficiency in 
education production,  
 
* ξ it it yy = + , 
where ξit is i.i.d. with zero mean and finite variance.  Assume that y
* is small enough, and 
we ignore a negative range of yit.
5  ξit could reflect transitory changes in school 
environments.  For instance, when the curriculum is changed, schools temporarily need 
additional teachers until existing teachers can accommodate the change. 
Let ei(Li,Hi) denote an efficiency function, where Li and Hi are learners and 
educators in school i, respectively.  I assume the efficiency function takes a quadratic loss 
form, 
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5 The optimal LER can change as endowment and technology in education production vary across schools, 
if these factors alter the marginal productivity of educators.  When other non-personnel inputs and LERs 
are substitutable, equal LERs are not necessary for equal education output.  Conditions on price structure 
and production function are discussed in a more general setting in Appendix A. 8 
where LER determines the learning efficiency.
6  The total educational outcome is defined 
as ei(Li,Hi)Li.  Each school has its static budget constraint, qiLi + Gi>=wHi, where qi is 




iii HHH =+: 
two types of educators, subsidized and nonsubsidized, 
s
i H  and 
u
i H , respectively.  By 
definition, the budget constraint can be separated into two constraints:  (1) government 
subsidy constraint,  i
s
i Gw H >= , and (2) school fee constraint, 
u
ii i qL w H >= .  
Nonsubsidized teachers are paid only from school fees.  However, since the quality of 
subsidized and nonsubsidized educators is the same under the above framework, the two 
budget constraints can be added together.  Assume that the government decides the per-
learner subsidy, gi, so Gi = giLi and gi ≥ 0 for all i (government does not impose tax). 
The school fee is bounded above by some limit,  () i qf, determined by 
socioeconomic circumstances f of the school.  In particular, the fee is determined by 
income level and distribution.
7  In fact, school fees are determined by school boards 
consisting of educators and community leaders, such that most parents can afford to pay.  
Unless government subsidy gi offsets qi(f), local condition f affects 
L
H .  School maximizes 
the per-learner education output subject to the budget constraints:  
                                                 
6 In the range of LERs below the target, the efficiency is increasing in LER.  It is assumed that with 
positive externalities among peer students, an increase in class size raises efficiency.  However, if this 
effect is negligible, the target level can be set arbitrarily small. 
7 For example, if community members vote for the school fee, it is determined by the median income. 9 
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The LER is constrained below by the ratio of educator wage (per-educator cost) to the 
sum of the school fee and per-learner subsidy (per-learner revenue).  When the school 
decides on the school fee and employs educators, the determination of the school fee is 
simple:  () () ii qf _ qf
∗ = , i.e., collect the highest school fees.
8  In this model, I do not allow 
learners to drop out in response to an increase in school fees (i.e., inelastic enrollment).
9  
Suppose, now, that budget constraints are not binding.  Then, the optimal solution 
is  
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H
∗∗
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8 Since 1996, the school fee at public schools is determined by school governing body (SGB), which 
consists of the principal, educators, parents (including community leaders), and sometimes learners.   
Therefore, the level of the school fee reflects community opinions.  In the community-school governance, 
the school fee increases as the median of monthly household income increases and as the standard 
deviation of monthly household income decreases.  The former result is consistent with the voting 
implication, while the latter implies that school fee determination is anti-inequality.  In this sense, school 
governance is altruistic to poor families who have difficulty paying the school fee, but it potentially 
sacrifices school quality (Yamauchi and Nishiyama 2003). 
9 The proportion of students who could not pay the school fee, including both postponing payment and 
official exemptions, is positively correlated with the level of the school fee (see, e.g., Yamauchi and 
Nishiyama 2003). 10 
In this case,  β ii H L
∗ = , where β
* = 1/y
*.  Next, consider the case where the budget 
constraint is binding:   φ(( ) ) i yq f g w







































where w < β
*(-qi(f) + gi).  The second term is an efficiency loss in terms of educator size.  
The government will allocate the subsidies to those with binding budget constraints.  
Next, consider the government￿s allocation of school subsidies.  Assume that the 
government maximizes the total educational output, 
ii i eL ∑ , subject to its budget 
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Without the government budget constraint, the necessary condition is 
  () ii gw y q f
∗∗ =− − . 
In general, we have 2 φ () φ () λ
ii i yg g
∗′ −− = ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier.  
From this, we also know that when ￿qi(f) decreases, gi increases to compensate for gaps 11 
in the capability of collecting school fees (community endowment).  In other words, 
LERs are equalized under the benevolent government￿s unitary decision. 
So, without government intervention, LERs are determined by school-level 
liquidity (budget) constraints, provided that the best ratio is unique in all schools no 
matter what racial group they belong to.  However, we expect that with active 
government interventions, the ratios will be equalized across all schools.  In particular, 
the subsidy is allocated more to those schools with less favorable socioeconomic 
circumstances, that is, larger initial LERs. 
Empirical Specification, Identification, and Estimation 
In empirical implementation, I use a modified condition from equation (2):  
  φβ φγ () ￿ ε it it it it it i it HI y I y p L
∗∗ ∗ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
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* ≥ γit(p), p denotes population group and µi is the fixed effect that reflects 
unobserved school- and community-specific components.  Here, local condition f is also 
represented by population group p.  In the analysis using the SRN, the information on 
subsidies and school fees is not available.  However, I assume the patterns in which these 
two variables are determined to differ across population groups.  I estimate γit(p) as a 
reduced form parameter in the estimation of equation (3). 
In equation (3), as in many cross-section studies, it is likely that the number of 
learners correlates with the unobserved fixed component µi, which will bias the OLS 
estimate of the slope.  For example, in communities experiencing rapid urbanization￿
where teachers can easily commute from urban centers and migration comes in￿the 
numbers of learners and educators will increase simultaneously.  In this case, OLS 
estimates are biased upward.  Assuming that parameters do not change over the four 12 
years, once conditioning on cross-group differences, we difference them between two 
periods:  
  γ () ε ip p ip i
p
Hd p L ∈∈ ∆= ∆ + ∆ ∑ , (4) 
where ∆ is the differencing operator and d(p) is an indicator variable of population group 
p.  The shocks are assumed to be ex post in each period. 
The parameter of interest represents the degree of liquidity constraint.  As we will 
see in Section 4 (Distribution Comparison), the empirical distributions of LERs motivate 
the analysis of determinants for the observed LER gaps across population groups.  
However, naive comparisons of LER distributions cannot identify school and government 
behavior, i.e., how the educator side of the ratio changes in response to changes in 
classroom size, and how likely the liquidity constraint is binding in adjusting the number 
of educators.  Changes in classroom size represent changes in fundamentals to schools or 
by the government that adjusts the number of educators.
10 
Since the main interest of this paper is differences in school behavior across 
population groups, I grouped schools into five groups:  Black, White, Coloured, Indian, 
and others (new schools) in equation (4).  I use race-group dummies to approximate 
differences in patterns where liquidity and subsidy constraints bind decisionmaking 
regarding the employment of educators.  In the above framework, we cannot distinguish 
whether liquidity-cum-resource constraint is binding or the target ratio is different across 
the groups.  I exclude the latter case here (see Appendix A).  In the estimation, I also use 
magisterial district dummies to capture variations across population groups within 
districts in which schools and communities are more homogeneous than those in a whole 
province.  By focusing on within-district, cross-race differences, I can identify how 
                                                 
10 The approach I am taking looks similar to one used in studies of liquidity constraint in firms investment 
behavior.  However, in this method, investment is regressed on changes in sales revenue that represent 
exogenous shocks.  The null hypothesis is that changes in sales revenue have no effect on investment, 
without liquidity constraint. 13 
differentially the liquidity constraint binds the decision on adjusting educator size across 
population groups.  In the null hypothesis that all the budget is pooled over all population 
groups, the liquidity (budget) constraint should bind equally for all the groups. 
The estimation of equation (4) requires additional consideration.  It is possible for 
the past shock in educator size (εi1) to partly cause subsequent changes in the number of 
learners, E[∆Liepεi1] ≠ 0.  Suppose that a positive shock to educator size increases the 
incentives for potential learners to attend the school.  This positive correlation leads to a 
negative bias in the OLS estimator in equation (4).  In this sense, the endogenous 
movement (decisionmaking) of learners influences the magnitude of the negative bias.  
Under this circumstance, it is likely that the true value of the slope is between a possibly 
upwardly biased estimate from the cross-section analysis [equation (3)] and a possibly 
downwardly biased estimate from the panel analysis [equation (4)]. 
To obtain consistent estimates in equation (4), I use instrumental variables for the 
change in learner size (FE-IV estimates).  The instruments used in the estimation are all 
taken from the 1996 data:  the number of classrooms, the number of learners, indicators 
of road access, building conditions, the interactions of these variables with population 
group dummies, and magisterial district dummies.  Except for the number of learners in 
1996, these variables are on school infrastructure, which we reasonably assume are 
difficult to change in a short period of time.  The instrumentation wipes out the 
correlation between changes in learner size and past shocks (in 1996) in order to obtain a 
consistent slope estimate. 
The first-stage results would be interesting on their own.  Regressing changes in 
class size on the initial time conditions (including initial class size), we would know how 
students and households have moved across schools over the four years.  If the number of 
learners has decreased at large schools in the initial stage, variations in class size would 
decrease.  This occurs not only by voluntary movement of learners from one school to 
another, but also by government decisions to merge different schools or split large 14 
schools to equalize school size.  Differences across population groups are also of our 
interest. 
More technically, under the assumption that educator shock is ex post in each 
period, these predetermined instruments, Zi1, need to be orthogonal to the shocks in both 
periods, and be correlated with subsequent changes in learners, namely 
11 21 εε 0 ii ii EZ EZ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ==  and  1 0 ii EL Z ⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∆≠ .  The instruments are school facility 
characteristics that are difficult to change in the short run, except for the number of 
learners in 1996.  There are two merits in the instrumental variable estimation.  First, the 
endogenous movement of learners, correlated with the past shocks to educators, will be 
eliminated in the estimation, and therefore it would be possible to infer the (relative) 
magnitude of learner movement and the differences across population groups.  Second, in 
FE-IV results, we obtain consistent estimates that, if our conjecture is correct, should be 
between the cross-section and FE-OLS estimates. 
There is a delicate technical issue on the orthogonality condition.  In reality, since 
the number of educators and learners were surveyed at the same time, it would be 
difficult to assume that the shock is realized later than when the 1996 learner size is 
determined.  However, unless households in neighboring communities have the ex ante 
information on unpredictable changes in educator size, the assumption on the 
orthogonality of the 1996 learner size, and the 1996 shock to educators in 1996, can still 
hold. 
Alternatively, if the current condition of school facility (e.g., building conditions) 
signals government subsidy in the future, the information on school facility could 
indirectly signal subsequent changes in educators.  For example, bad building conditions 
likely receive more attention from the government and will receive more funding in the 
near future; then more educators can be employed.  If this holds, the initial condition 
(instruments) could be correlated with the 1996 error term.  However, it depends on the 
reliability of such a signal contained in the facility information (i.e., how predictable 
government behavior is in the future).  If households have such signals, however, learner 15 
size can adjust accordingly.  Hence, it is reflected in the first-stage regression in which 
the initial conditions explain subsequent changes in learner size. 
3.  Data￿School Register of Needs 
School Register of Needs, with its focus on school-facility conditions, was 
initially fielded in 1996.  In that survey, trained fieldworkers attempted to visit all schools 
in the country and collected information from educators, mainly school principals.  
Although the survey￿s coverage was found to be imperfect (some schools were not 
successfully located during the survey preparation stage), it was the first systematic 
school census in the country.  Schools were identified by school codes provided by 
provincial departments of education (EMIS codes) and by province codes, and also by 
latitude and longitude using a global positioning system. 
Four years later, the National Department of Education conducted the second 
round of the survey.  At this time, however, data were collected through questionnaires 
distributed to school principals.  This means of data collection alerts us to possible errors 
in the recorded answers, especially those on facility conditions.  For example, principals 
might want to underreport school facilities in the hope of obtaining additional funding.  
To minimize this problem, the questionnaire was designed to elicit only changes from 
1996 conditions, which were described in the distributed form.  Even with potential 
measurement errors and bias in some questions, the 2000 survey accomplished almost 
perfect coverage of schools in the country.  In particular, fieldworkers visited those 
schools that were missed in SRN 1996.  Unlike SRN 1996, the 2000 version does not 
include technical colleges and special schools, but completely covers all primary, 
secondary, and combined schools (for detailed discussions on SRN 2000 and 1996, see 
Technical Reports on SRN 2000, EduAction 2001).
11 
                                                 
11 The data that I use here were provided by EduAction, Durban, and the National Department of 
Education, Pretoria. 16 
For the purpose of constructing panel data, it is important to note that EMIS codes 
are also available in SRN 2000.  However, some provincial departments of education 
changed the EMIS codes after 1996, and the details of the code changes are not 
transparent.  Therefore, I decided to use only provinces that use the same EMIS codes in 
2000 as they did in 1996.  Through this process, Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and Northern 
Cape were excluded from the sample in the analysis below. 
Another important feature of SRN 2000 is that it asked about former departments 
that governed the schools under the apartheid regime.  From this information, we can 
correctly identify the racial background of each school under the previous regime.  The 
correspondence between former departments and population groups is as follows. 
Black  Department of Education and Training (DET) 
White  Department of Education and Culture: House of Assembly (HOA) 
Coloured  Department of Education and Culture: House of Reprentatives (HOR) 
Indian  Department of Education and Culture: House of Delegates (HOD) 
Black  Bophuthatswana Education Department (BOP) 
Black  Ciskei Education Department (CISKEI) 
Black  Gazankulu Department of Education (GZK) 
Black  KaNgwane Department of Education (KaNGWANE) 
Black  KwaNdebele Department of Education (KND) 
Black  KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture (KZ) 
Black  Lebowa Department of Education (LEB) 
Black  QwaQwa Department of Education (QWAQWA) 
Black  Transkei Education Department (TRANSKEI) 
Black  Venda Education Department (VENDA) 
All races 
New schools established under the new provincial education 
departments between 1994 and 2000 
 
It is also true that under the post-apartheid regime, children of any racial origin 
can attend any school.  In our analysis, those schools established after apartheid will be 
grouped as ￿new schools.￿  It should be noted here that, even though schools are sorted 
by former departments, the period that our analysis covers falls after apartheid.  
Therefore, all schools are technically raceless both in 1996 and 2000.  However, as 
mentioned in the introduction, the reality of racial composition of learners has not 
changed substantially since apartheid (see, e.g., Annual School Survey 1999).  The 
majority of formerly Black schools are still in communities that are predominantly Black, 17 
so students in those schools remain mostly Black as well.  Some formerly White schools 
now accept children from Black families with relatively high incomes and residing with 
commuting distance.  Therefore, although the focus on population groups is approximate, 
as it does not reflect exact racial composition in each school, it does capture the essence 
of social distance across racial groups in South Africa today. 
However, the information on former departments is available only in SRN 2000, 
not in SRN 1996.  It is therefore necessary to merge SRNs 1996 and 2000 by EMIS and 
provincial codes in order to group schools covered in SRN 1996 by population group.  
Through this merging process, excluding Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and Northern Cape for 
the reason mentioned above, nearly 10 percent of primary and secondary schools in SRN 
1996 do not match those in SRN 2000.  In the panel analysis on dynamic changes from 
1996 to 2000, and in the cross-sectional analysis on differences across population groups 
even in SRN 1996, I use those schools that were correctly matched between SRN 1996 
and SRN 2000. 
In the preliminary stage of analysis, I have detected some incomplete data in SRN 
1996, e.g., some schools did not report the number of classrooms.  I tried not to use such 
incomplete variables from SRN 1996.  However, since the number of classrooms is 
important as an instrument, I have used schools that have information on the number of 
classrooms even in non-instrumented cases. 
4.  Empirical Findings 
This section summarizes empirical results.  Three types of empirical analyses are 
conducted.  First, I statistically characterize the distributions of LER in 1996 and 2000 in 
different population groups.  Cumulative distributions of LER are compared, and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are used for statistical comparisons of LER distributions of 
formerly Black schools with other schools.  Second, to investigate the relationship 
between changes in educators and learners, I take a flexible non-parametric approach 
incorporating global shapes of the dynamic relationships.  Third, in a panel analysis that 18 
differences out all fixed effects, I use FE-IV estimation to identify the relationship 
parametrically￿correcting for endogenous changes in learners over time￿and compare 
them across population groups in order to detect how likely budget constraints are 
binding the dynamic adjustment of educators. 
Distribution Comparison 
Figures 1 and 2 show LER distributions in public primary and secondary schools 
by 1996 and 2000, respectively.  Primary (Grades 1-7), junior primary (Grades 1-4), and 
senior primary (Grades 5-7) are summed as primary schools, and secondary (Grades 
8-12), junior secondary (Grades 8-10), and senior secondary (Grades 11-12) are grouped 
as secondary schools.  In these figures, distributions are shown for different former 
population groups:  Black (African), White, Coloured, Indian, and new schools. 
For formerly Black and new schools, LER distributions have long upper tails.  For 
the sake of display, the values of LER larger than 200 were omitted in these graphs, 
though there are substantial numbers of formerly Black and new schools in this range.  
On the other hand, the distributions are shown to be concentrated in the range of 
relatively small values for formerly White, Coloured, and Indian schools.  This basic 
characterization of differences in LER distributions across former population groups is 
valid for all types of schools, primary and secondary.  The main findings on cross-group 
differences are quite similar in both primary and secondary schools.  Figure 2 also shows 
similar characteristics of the 2000 LERs. 
To characterize stochastic dominance, Figures 3-6 display cumulative 
distributions of LER for formerly Black and one of the other schools:  White, Coloured, 
Indian, and new schools for 1996 and 2000.  For both primary and secondary, the LER of 
formerly Black schools stochastically dominates the others, except new schools.  These 
observations confirm the previous findings on the gaps in LER across schools in former 
population groups. 19 
Figure 1￿Learner/educator ratio:  Primary level 
 












African = 1, White = 2, Coloured = 3, Indian = 4, Others = 5 
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Figure 2￿Learner/educator ratio:  Secondary level 
 












African = 1, White = 2, Coloured = 3, Indian = 4, Others = 5 
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Figure 3￿Cumulative learner/educator ratio, primary schools, 1996 
 




  Figure 3b. 
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Figure 4￿Cumulative learner/educator ratio, primary schools, 2000 
 




  Figure 4b. 
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Figure 5￿Cumulative learner/educator ratio, secondary schools, 1996 
 




  Figure 5b. 
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Figure 6￿Cumulative learner/educator ratio, secondary schools, 2000 
 
  Figure 6a. 
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  Figure 6b. 
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To statistically characterize differences in the LER distribution between formerly 
Black schools and the other schools, I use Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (shown in Tables 
2a and 2b).  Table 2a shows two basic findings.  First, in the country as a whole, the LER 
distributions of Black primary and secondary schools are statistically different from those 
of White, Coloured, and Indian schools in 1996 and 2000.  In particular, the test statistics 
show that the distance between Black and White has not been narrowed from 1996 to 
2000. 
Table 2b shows provincial-level results on Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.  In 
provincial levels, I find that the results differ between provinces in 1996 and 2000.  In 
1996, the distance between Black and White primary schools is found to be significant in 
many provinces, except Free State and North West, where the distances to Coloured, 
Indian, and others are also insignificant.  In 2000, however, Black and White primary 
schools are significantly different in all provinces.  In this sense, the difference remains 
quite robust between Black and White in post-apartheid South Africa.  In secondary 
schools, findings are stronger than those on primary schools.  In Free State and North 
West, where Black and White are not different in primary schools, the distance is 
statistically significant in both 1996 and 2000. 
Hence, the findings clearly confirm our prior perception that formerly Black 
schools, at both primary and secondary levels, have not improved relative to formerly 
White schools, even under the post-apartheid government.  This does not directly imply 
that Black children in the country suffer more from low educational quality than White 
children.  In post-apartheid South Africa, no schools may discriminate based on 
children￿s racial origin, and children of any racial origin are selectively admitted.  
However, since most communities are still racially homogeneous, the former population 
group (available from the 2000 SRN) still represents the majority at the school level. 
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Table 2￿Tests on distribution comparison:  Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 
equality of distribution functions￿D values (p values), South Africa and by 
province, 1996 and 2000 
Table 2a￿South Africa (excluding Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and Northern Cape) 
   White Coloured Indian  New  schools 
Primary  1996  0.5019 (0.000)  0.4185 (0.000)  0.5156 (0.000)  0.1348 (0.026) 
  2000  0.3370 (0.000)  0.1279 (0.000)  0.1843 (0.001)  0.2208 (0.000) 
Secondary  1996  0.6729 (0.000)  0.6228 (0.000)  0.6677 (0.000)  0.2157 (0.000) 
  2000  0.5202 (0.000)  0.2565 (0.000)  0.2710 (0.000)  0.1949 (0.000) 
Notes:  The numbers on the left are D values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, and the p values are in parentheses.  
The distributions of White, Coloured, Indian, and new schools are compared to Black schools. 
 
Table 2b￿By provinces 
Province White  Coloured  Indian  New  schools 
Eastern  Cape               
  Primary  1996  0.5074  (0.000)  0.5037 (0.000)  n.a.    0.3454  (0.006) 
  2000  0.2917  (0.001) 0.1971 (0.000) 0.6399 (0.235) 0.2583  (0.000) 
  Secondary  1996  0.6977  (0.002)  0.5803 (0.000)  0.7017 (0.598)  0.2643  (0.035) 
  2000  0.4953  (0.000) 0.2194 (0.067) 0.5442 (0.877) 0.1564  (0.007) 
Free  State             
  Primary  1996  0.2152  (0.152)  0.1152 (0.516)  0.4504 (0.154)  0.3495  (0.024) 
  2000  0.2140  (0.168) 0.1506 (0.234) 0.6553 (0.010) 0.4138  (0.000) 
  Secondary  1996  0.6217  (0.000)  0.7205 (0.001)  0.9379 (0.243)  0.2531  (0.917) 
  2000  0.5099  (0.000) 0.3220 (0.055) 0.9634 (0.216) 0.6391  (0.000) 
KwaZulu  Natal             
  Primary  1996  0.5521  (0.001)  0.1284 (0.331)  0.6604 (0.000)  0.2115  (0.549) 
  2000  0.5798  (0.000) 0.0792 (0.628) 0.3036 (0.000) 0.2013  (0.000) 
  Secondary  1996  0.7227  (0.000)  0.6012 (0.000)  0.6141 (0.000)  0.2212  (0.873) 
  2000  0.6592  (0.000) 0.2141 (0.152) 0.4566 (0.000) 0.2577  (0.000) 
Northern  Province             
  Primary  1996  0.7360  (0.000)  0.5039 (0.148)  0.9753 (0.201)  0.2545  (0.010) 
  2000  0.2988  (0.005) 0.3184 (0.838) 0.7742 (0.465) 0.4093  (0.000) 
  Secondary  1996  0.9194  (0.000)  n.a.    0.9964 (0.183)  0.2582  (0.004) 
 2000  0.4068  (0.014)  0.4549 (0.662)  n.a.    0.2743  (0.000) 
North  West             
  Primary  1996  0.5789  (0.032)  0.2244 (0.587)  0.3581 (0.218)  0.2008  (0.382) 
  2000  0.2152  (0.576) 0.3739 (0.022) 0.2901 (0.260) 0.2875  (0.001) 
  Secondary  1996  0.8347  (0.001)  0.5785 (0.829)  0.8760 (0.319)  0.3361  (0.391) 
  2000  0.5670  (0.000) 0.7050 (0.154) 0.4330 (0.729) 0.2160  (0.493) 
Western  Cape             
  Primary  1996  0.8714  (0.000)  0.7492 (0.000)  0.9302 (0.001)  0.5168  (0.011) 
  2000  0.7448  (0.000) 0.4732 (0.000) 0.7778 (0.024) 0.3333  (0.030) 
  Secondary  1996  0.9375  (0.000)  0.8548 (0.000)  0.9688 (0.025)  0.5417  (0.253) 
  2000  0.8141  (0.000) 0.3774 (0.000) 0.3182 (0.871) 0.1773  (0.923) 
Notes:  The numbers on the left are D values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics, and the p values are in 
parentheses.  The distributions of White, Coloured, Indian, and new schools are compared to Black 
schools. 27 
Nonparametric Approach 
To cope with variations in the slope parameter across population groups and 
regions, and possibly at various levels of learner changes, I sort them by population 
groups to the extent that the sample size of each group can permit analysis.  In 
preliminary analyses, I found that if I use primary and secondary schools separately, 
sample sizes for non-Black schools at provincial levels became too small to obtain 
reliable nonparametric results. 
On Black secondary schools by provinces, it is also found that changes in 
numbers of educators responded to those in learners positively in all provinces.  
However, except KZ, the variations in numbers of educators seem to be larger in this case 
than those in primary schools.  This finding is again consistent with a result in Table 6 
that the effect of LER 1996 on changes in numbers of educators is much larger in 
secondary schools (around 0.22) than primary schools (0.09-0.10).  In this sense, the 
equity-improving interventions were larger in secondary schools, and worked to narrow 
the gaps across schools. 
Figures 7a-7f depict the relationships between changes in primary-school 
educators and learners in 1996-2000 for all races and for different racial groups.  The 
samples I use in this exercise are constructed as follows.  Among schools that are 
successfully matched between SRN 1996 and 2000 by EMIS and province codes, I only 
use those classified as state or state-aided as funding types in 1996, those with learner 
changes in the range of -1,000 to 1,000, and with educator changes in the range of -100 to 
100.  I dropped observations with missing values in the total number of educators in 1996 
or 2000.  Primary schools include normal primary (Grades 1-7), junior primary (Grades 
1-4), and senior primary (Grades 5-7) in the 1996 survey.  Similarly, secondary schools 
also include normal secondary (Grades 8-12), junior secondary (Grades 8-10), and senior 
secondary (Grades 11-12) in 1996.  If schools changed the range of grades during the 
period, they experienced large increases or decreases in numbers of learners. 28 
Figure 7a￿Different educators versus different learners:  Primary 
 
 Different  learners 
  Note:  Lowess smoother, bandwidth = .8. 
 
Figure 7b￿Different educators versus different learners:  Primary￿African 
 









































Figure 7c￿Different educators versus different learners:  Primary￿White 
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Figure 7d￿Different educators versus different learners:  Primary￿Coloured 
 









































Figure 7e￿Different educators versus different learners:  Primary￿Indian 
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Figure 7f￿Different educators versus different learners:  Primary￿New schools 
 









































In Figure 7a, the relationship is close to linear, but shows a slightly convex shape.  
However, it is asymmetric between when class size increases and decreases.  The 
response of educators to increases in class size is larger than that for decreases in class 
size.  In Figure 7b, in Black schools, we have the same observations.  However, for 
White, Coloured, and Indian schools, nonlinearity becomes very strong (Figures 7c, 7d, 
and 7e).  In White schools, while most observations are concentrated in small learner-size 
changes, the overall shape in the dynamics is kinked with concavity.  Among Coloured 
and Indian schools, however, the relationship is kinked and convex.  Observations in 
these groups are also concentrated in small changes.  In new schools that were 
established after 1994, it is nearly a straight line (Table 7f). 
Figures 8a-8f depict the cases of secondary schools.  As in the case of primary 
schools, a nearly linear but slightly convex relationship is observed in all schools in the 
country (Figure 8a).  The basic relationship holds among Black schools (Figure 8b).  
Figure 8c shows White schools:  it looks strikingly similar to the case of primary schools.  
Though observations are less concentrated in small class size changes than primary 
schools, the shape is kinked and concave.  Strikingly, the number of educators does not 
respond enough to large changes in numbers of learners, but it does respond to small 
changes.  Since the number of observations with large changes of learners is small, the 
nonparametric averaging procedure becomes sensitive to particular observations.  For this 
reason, we should focus our attention on the range of reasonably small changes. 
One interesting observation from all these figures is that the cross-school 
variations in educator changes are quite large.  The variations are large even with small 
changes in numbers of learners.  One way to explain this observation is that government 
interventions narrow the initially existing differences in LER not directly responding to 
changes in class size.  Alternatively, even without the government intervention, schools 
might have made efforts to weaken the liquidity (budget) constraints to adjust the number 
of educators.  In either case, we expect that larger 1996 LERs induce larger subsequent 
increases in educators.  To test this point, I switch to parametric estimation. 32 
Figure 8a￿Different educators versus different learners:  Secondary 
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Figure 8b￿Different educators versus different learners:  Secondary￿African 
 









































Figure 8c￿Different educators versus different learners:  Secondary￿White 
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Figure 8d￿Different educators versus different learners:  Secondary￿Coloured 
 









































Figure 8e￿Different educators versus different learners:  Secondary￿Indian 
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Figure 8f￿Different educators versus different learners:  Secondary￿New schools 
 









































Fixed Effect, Instrumental Variable Estimation 
This section shows the estimation results, taking into account community- and 
school-level unobservable fixed components and the endogeneity of over-time changes in 
the number of learners.  To deal with the fixed effects, I difference out the fixed effects 
between 1996 and 2000, using changes in the number of educators and learners.  Even in 
this differenced form, district-level dummies are included to control district-wide 
common changes in this period.  The focus of this exercise is on the differences across 
population groups in the response of the number of educators to changes in the number of 
learners.  With district-level dummies, this procedure essentially tries to identify cross-
group variations in the educator adjustment within each district. 
This identification strategy calls for an attention on the spatial residential pattern 
in South Africa, i.e., residential pattern is segregated by racial groups.  In the former 
homeland districts, for example, most communities are predominantly Black, so there are 
few formerly White schools.  This situation makes it difficult to identify gaps in school 
behavior between formerly Black and White schools.  However, considering that 
socioeconomic circumstances are so diverse in different districts in the country, it is more 
important to control the district-wide heterogeneity in terms of learners￿ movement and 
school decisionmaking. 
We also need to consider a possible correlation between past shocks to educators 
and subsequent changes in numbers of learners over time.  If so, the OLS estimates in the 
differenced forms will provide negatively biased estimates of the slopes.  In this section, I 
not only difference out the fixed effects but use instrumental variables available from 
1996 so that consistent estimates of the slopes are obtained.  The details were already 
discussed in Section 2.  The results are summarized in Tables 3a and 3b for primary and 
secondary schools, respectively.  I also decompose the educators into two categories:  
subsidized and nonsubsidized. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3a show the response of the number of all educators to 
changes in the number of learners, without and with instruments.  First, the number of  36 
Table 3a￿Dynamic response:  Public primary schools 
  Dependent variable:  Difference in educators 
  All educators  Subsidized    Nonsubsidized 
  FE FE-IV  FE FE-IV    FE FE-IV 
Difference in learners  0.0068  0.0038  0.0065 0.0038    0.0003 -0.00001 
 (3.13)  (2.29)  (3.14)  (2.27)    (1.04)  (0.03) 
*White 0.0107  0.0626  0.0044  0.0496    0.0063  -0.0075 
 (2.89)  (3.84)  (1.050  (3.01)    (3.41)  (0.81) 
*Coloured 0.0018  0.0367  0.0018  0.0202    -0.00007  -0.0015 
 (0.61)  (2.27)  (0.69)  (2.68)    (0.13)  (1.04) 
*Indian 0.0094  0.0289  0.0079  0.0405    0.0015  -0.0123 
 (4.75)  (3.40)  (4.26)  (4.26)    (2.04)  (2.93) 
*New schools  0.0167  0.0258  0.0159  0.0568    0.0008  -0.0053 
 (1.72)  (2.05)  (1.62)  (2.19)    (0.57)  (1.68) 
*Indicator increase  0.0122  -0.0313  0.0120  -0.0374    0.0003  0.0128 
 (3.96)  (2.59)  (3.90)  (2.63)    (0.54)  (2.53) 
Hausman-Wu (chi-square)    56.93    53.18      16.99 
p-value   0.0000    0.0000      0.0746 
Number of observations  4,663  4,663  4,663  4,663    4,663  4,663 
R-square 0.3823  n.a.  0.4028 n.a.    0.1666  n.a. 
Notes:  The numbers in parentheses are t values.  All specifications include race and district dummies.  Robust standard 
errors are used with district-level clusters.  In Columns 2, 4, and 6, the instruments are the number of 
classrooms, the number of learners, building condition indicators, road access indicators￿all in 1996, 
interacted with population group dummies, population group dummies, and district dummies. 
 
Table 3b￿Dynamic response:  Public secondary schools 
  Dependent variable:  Difference in educators 
  All educators  Subsidized    Nonsubsidized 
  FE FE-IV  FE FE-IV    FE FE-IV 
Difference in learners  0.0087  0.0118  0.0081 0.0108    0.0005  0.0009 
 (4.60)  (4.48)  (4.35)  (4.07)    (1.53)  (1.27) 
*White -0.0069  -0.0116  -0.0087  -0.0092    0.0018  -0.0024 
 (2.51)  (3.94)  (2.98)  (1.64)    (1.71)  (0.63) 
*Coloured 0.0133  0.0188  0.0126  0.0171    0.0007  0.0018 
 (3.23)  (1.99)  (2.83)  (1.79)    (0.84)  (0.93) 
*Indian 0.0112  -0.0035  0.0096  -0.0048    0.0017  0.0014 
 (1.25)  (0.37)  (1.06)  (0.51)    (1.67)  (0.43) 
*New schools  0.0023  -0.0005  0.0015  -0.0017    0.0008  0.0012 
 (0.99)  (0.16)  (0.63)  (0.49)    (1.14)  (1.31) 
*Indicator increase  0.0080  0.0050  0.0079  0.0078    0.00005  -0.0028 
 (2.36)  (0.52)  (2.26)  (0.77)    (0.06)  (0.72) 
Hausman-Wu (chi-square)    2.17    4.23      22.87 
p-value   0.9978    0.9627      0.0184 
Number of observations  1,646  1,646  1,646  1,646    1,646  1,646 
R-square 0.5209  0.5063  0.5300  0.5169    0.3658  0.3425 
Notes:  The numbers in parentheses are t values.  All specifications include race and district dummies.  Robust standard 
errors are used with district-level clusters.  In Columns 2, 4, and 6, the instruments are the number of 
classrooms, the number of learners, building condition indicators, road access indicators￿all in 1996, 
interacted with population group dummies, population group dummies, and district dummies. 37 
educators responds positively to an increase in the number of learners.  Second, in this 
basic specification, differences from Black schools are all significant.  As the number of 
learners increases, the number of educators increases more largely in White, Coloured, 
Indian, and new schools than in Black schools.  Third, the interaction of changes in 
number of learners with the indicator of learners￿ increase shows some asymmetry in the 
educators￿ adjustment.  However, the signs of this asymmetric effect are not the same in 
noninstrumented and instrumented cases.  Fourth, the endogeneity of changes in number 
of learners was significant in Hausman-Wu test, and the comparison of parameter 
estimates proves downward bias. 
In columns 3 and 4 where I use only subsidized educators, basic findings that 
obtained in all educators hold.  Columns 5 and 6 show the case of nonsubsidized 
educators.  Though most estimates are insignificant, and we cannot detect significant 
endogeneity, most of the estimates show upward bias.  This implies that the shock to the 
numbers of nonsubsidized educators in 1996 may decrease the subsequent increase in 
class size.  This observation creates some interesting questions, but since Hausman-Wu 
test shows only weak differences in the estimates, it is dangerous to go further.  Contrary 
to the previous cases, the number of nonsubsidized educators increases more significantly 
when the class size increases than when it decreases. 
Appendix B, Table 5 shows the first-stage regression results on the effects of the 
initial conditions on subsequent changes in class size.  The table only shows the estimates 
of the numbers of learners and classrooms in 1996.  Columns 1 and 2 show results on 
primary and secondary schools, respectively.  The benchmark case is a Black school in 
both cases.  In formerly Black primary schools, a larger number of classrooms will 
accommodate more learners while a larger initial class size will reduce subsequent 
growth of class size.  Therefore, class sizes converge over time.  Interestingly, the 
convergence is largest among Black schools.  The difference between White and 
Coloured schools is statistically significant.  Analogously, the classroom effect is the 
largest among Black schools.  Thus, even though liquidity constraint is most likely 38 
binding among Black schools, the dynamic changes in class size are equalizing class 
sizes most strongly in Black schools. 
Table 3b displays the estimation results for secondary schools.  The results are 
very different from those in primary schools.  The benchmark response of Black school 
educators is significant in all three cases.  Contrary to primary school cases, the 
endogeneity of the changes in number of learners was not detected statistically.  First, 
except for White schools, there are not significant differences in the educator adjustment 
behavior from Black schools.  Second, very interestingly, the response of the White 
school educators to changes in the number of learners is smaller than the benchmark 
Black school case.  Adding the two estimates gives a nearly zero response in White 
schools.  This drastic difference from the primary school case suggests that at the 
secondary level, the educator size has been close to optimal among White schools, so that 
even in response to relatively small changes in class size, schools do not adjust the 
number of educators significantly.  Third, however, Coloured schools show stronger 
responses than Black schools.  There seem to be larger behavioral variations across 
different population groups in secondary schools than primary schools.  Fourth, except 
the nonsubsidized educator case, changes in the number of educators are larger when the 
learner size increases than when it decreases. 
The first-stage results on learner size change in secondary schools are shown in 
Appendix B, Table 5, Column 2.  We confirm similar results on the effects of the initial 
conditions on learner size changes.  The more classrooms and the fewer learners, the 
more increase in learner size.  Interestingly, the differences between Black and White 
and/or Indian schools differ from the primary school case.  The convergence effect of 
learner size is nearly twice as large among White and Indian schools as Black schools.  
The classroom effect is also 3-4 times larger among White and Indian schools.  This 
suggests that school quality differentiation within White and Indian schools cannot be 
ignored. 39 
5.  Conclusions 
Our empirical results show that opportunities for education in public schools are 
still unequal between Black and White children in South Africa, even after apartheid.  
The ratios of learners to educators in public primary and secondary schools statistically 
differ between Black and White groups.  Strikingly, during the period 1996￿2000, the 
overall differences in the distribution have not changed, and in some cases the gaps have 
increased for secondary schools.  The inequality in opportunities for education could lead 
to persistent inequality in labor markets and earnings opportunities in South Africa. 
The dynamics of school education also demonstrate strong inequity between 
population groups.  Changes in the number of educators respond to changes in the 
number of learners in all population groups at primary school level.  However, the 
dynamic adjustment of educators is significantly larger for formerly White, Coloured, 
Indian, and new schools than for Black primary schools.  On the other hand, at the 
secondary school level, the results do not display significant apartheid-type inequity.  In 
the case of White schools, the number of educators does not respond to changes in the 
learner size, probably because of the superior initial condition. 
One possible reason why LER had not converged even after the abolition of 
apartheid is that the school fee charged at formerly White schools increased to shut out 
the entry of Black children (Selod and Zenou 2003).  This screening mechanism could 
possibly explain changes in class size and partially why LER had not converged rapidly.  
Analysis of this point is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
Our empirical results call for stronger policy support to Black primary schools 
and children, which promises the human-capital-based reduction of apartheid-created 
poverty, inequity, and inequality in South Africa. 
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Appendix A:  General Education Production Technology 
In this section, I discuss a general education production technology with multiple 
inputs.  Suppose that educators H and other nonpersonnel inputs X (such as building and 
computer facilities) are inputs to education production.  In addition, endowment affects 
education output.  As a benchmark, assume that factor markets for educators and other 
nonpersonnel inputs are perfect, and that the quality of educators is the same. 
Assume that per-learner education output is given as 
  (θ ) eeh x u = ,, , 
where h and x are per-learner educators and nonpersonnel inputs, respectively, θ is the 
quality of educators, and u is school-level and/or community-level endowment.  Note that 
here, the ratio of educators to learners (ELR) is h.  Simple maximization problem at 
school level is  
  max (θ ) θ
hx eh x u s t w h p xqg
, , ,. .+ ≤ + , 
where p is price for nonpersonnel inputs, w is educators￿ wage, q is per-learner school 
fee, and g is per-learner government subsidy.  It is assumed that higher educators￿ quality 
augments wage and productivity.  The necessary condition is eh/ex = w/p, where eh and ex 
are marginal productivity for h and x, respectively.  Note that θ does not affect the 
condition, as it changes eh and w proportionally.  With Cobb-Douglas function, for 
example, it is necessary that the optimal ratio of h and x is constant.  The assumption that 
w/p is the same in all regions leads to a unique ratio of h and x across all schools. 
Endowment (technology), u, can augment h and x.  If an increase in u causes 
Hicks neutral shifts, the optimal ratio of h to x will be constant.  If u augments h, the 
optimal ratio could be lower with a higher u, given constant w/p.  Often cited findings 
that h matters among minority and disadvantaged groups (with smaller u) imply that eh is 
diminishing as u increases (ehu < 0).  In the situation of South Africa, since formerly 41 
White schools have a higher endowment u than Blacks, it is predicted that h for formerly 
White schools (residential areas) is smaller than for Black schools, given constant w/p.  
This, however, contradicts the fact that LER is smaller for formerly White schools than 
Black schools. 
If ehu > 0 (i.e., h and u are complementary), a higher endowment makes h more 
productive.  Since White areas are well endowed, the optimal ratio of h to x could be 
larger than that for Black residential areas.  This can potentially explain the LER gaps 
between White and Black schools.  An empirical question is how much of the observed 
variations in LER could be attributed to the unobserved endowment. 
In terms of the model in Section 2, we may interpret the endowment u as local 
condition f, which affects school fee charged and therefore liquidity constraint.  If u 
constraints ￿q(f), it also limits h from above.  In Section 2, the quadratic loss function 
assumes that eh diminishes as u (or q) increases.  Therefore, it is implicitly assumed that 
ehu < 0. 
We consider two other special cases in which either wage or quality of educators 
is differentiated across regions (schools).  Suppose that the average quality of teachers 
hired in Black schools is lower than that in White schools and that wage paid is the same.  
In this case, the optimal ratio of h to x for White schools should be larger, since 
θeh/ex = w/p, where θ > 1.  Similarly, wage for teachers in urban areas can be generally 
higher than that in nonurban areas.  Without quality difference, other things being equal, 
the optimal ratio of h to x should be smaller in urban areas where White schools are 
mostly located, i.e., eh/ex = θw/p, where θ > 1.  The second case contradicts our 
observation that h is larger among White schools.  The two special cases were assumed 
out in the analysis. 
Finally, government policy depends on the observability of local endowment 
when it tries to achieve equal output.  It is necessary to take into account the endowment 
distribution in order to achieve equal education output e.  With imperfect information on 42 
the endowment, the government needs conditioning on observables when it forms the 
expectations on u. 
In Section 2, the model (1) assumed that factor markets are perfect, (2) assumed 
that the quality of educators is the same, and (3) ignored nonpersonnel inputs.  The focus 
of analysis is to highlight the situation where schools and/or the government attempt to 
achieve the optimal LER, yit, with liquidity constraint.  For simplicity, the model also 
assumed out a possibility that idiosyncratic endowment can affect the optimal level of 
LER at school or community level.  This is important, since this makes β
* heterogeneous 
across schools and communities.  With this modification, it would be difficult to identify 
the effect of liquidity constraint.  In the empirical analysis, therefore, we assume that the 
(unobserved) heterogeneity of the optimal LER (β
*) due to (unobserved) endowment is 
relatively smaller than that attributed to liquidity constraints. 
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deviation  Minimum Maximum
Public primary schools           
  Learners 1996  6,214  400.0599  366.1124  3  5,292 
  Educators 1996  6,234  11.62624  10.11832  1  68 
  Learners/ educators ratio 1996  6,168  34.02758  16.88301  1  536 
  Learners 2000  9,170  305.1333  307.7398  1  3,711 
  Educators 2000  9,422  9.066546  11.68714  1  805 
  Learners/ educators ratio 2000  9,170  31.55526  16.26099  0.0625  729 
Public secondary schools           
  Learners 1996  2,049  660.4461  399.2136  8  2,945 
  Educators 1996  2,046  23.33382  14.78122  1  90 
  Learners/ educators ratio 1996  2,035  30.48634  12.53213  1  150 
  Learners 2000  4,316  578.0461  350.3784  1  2,648 
  Educators 2000  4,455  19.08485  11.46771  1  94 
  Learners/ educators ratio 2000  4,316  31.18687  10.08921  0.3333  179 
Public primary schools           
  Difference in learners  5,366  -24.07697  161.6493  -3,986  2,692 
  Difference in educators  5,572  -0.6281407  4.100372  -49  104 
Public secondary schools           
  Difference in learners  1,830  -21.81639  231.2277  -2,225  1,014 
  Difference in educators  1,913  -1.934135  7.070909  -46  67 
Notes:  Sample does not include Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and Northern Cape provinces.  Primary schools in 1996 
include normal primary (Grades 1-7), junior primary (Grades 1-4), and senior primary schools (Grades 5-8).  
Secondary schools in 1996 include normal secondary (Grades 8-12), junior secondary (Grades 8-10), and senior 
secondary schools (Grades 10-12).  Primary schools in 2000 refer to those with lowest grade > = 1 and highest 
grade < = 7.  Secondary schools in 2000 refer to those with lowest grade > = 8 and highest grade < = 12.  Public 
schools in 1996 include state and state-aided schools, and in 2000 are schools that answered public. 44 
Table 5￿Learner size change 
  Dependent variable:  change in learner size from 1996 to 2000 
  Primary Secondary 
1996 Learner size  -0.326  -0.355 
 (4.42)  (7.80) 
* White  0.270  0.360 
 (2.99)  (1.71) 
* Coloured  0.204  0.117 
 (2.54)  (1.15) 
* Indian  0.158  -0.277 
 (1.33)  (2.56) 
* New schools  0.217  -0.223 
 (1.68)  (1.86) 
1996 Classroom  7.340  2.860 
 (2.64)  (2.29) 
* White  -6.570  10.193 
 (2.31)  (2.12) 
* Coloured  -5.980  1.165 
 (2.07)  (0.43) 
* Indian  -7.939  11.119 
 (2.19)  (2.86) 
* New schools  -8.121  4.461 
 (1.45)  (0.63) 
R-squared 0.3010  0.4682 
Number of observations  4,663  1,646 
Notes:  The numbers in parentheses are absolute t values.  Included are race dummies, building condition indicators, 
road access indicators, both interacted with race dummies, and district dummies, in addition to the variables 
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